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SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-WIDOW'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS Ex-
TENDED TO WOMAN WHOSE MARRIAGE WAS TECHNICALLY INVALID
UNDER PENNSYLVANIA'S PARAMOUR STATUTE.
Chlystek v. Califano (1979)
Helen Ondrako Chlystek, having lived with Adam Chlystek as his wife
since 1939,1 brought suit to recover widow's benefits under the Social Se-
curity Act (Act).2 Adam, the deceased wage earner, had been married to
Cecelia Nicklas Chlystek from 1927 until 1944 when she divorced him on
grounds of adultery, naming Helen as the correspondent in the divorce pro-
ceedings. 3 Although under the Pennsylvania paramour statute 4 Adam and
Helen were forbidden to marry during Cecelia's lifetime,5 they continued to
live together and to hold themselves out as husband and wife until Adam's
death in 1976.6 Except for the paramour statute, Adam and Helen would
have been able to establish a valid common law marriage. 7
Helen's claim for widow's benefits was denied by the Administrative
Law Judge," as was her request for review of the decision. 9 She sub-
sequently filed an appeal in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the administrative decision. 10 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit" reversed without dis-
sent, holding that for the purpose of determining entitlement to widow's
social security benefits, an otherwise valid common law marriage, contracted
in contravention of the Pennsylvania paramour statute, will be recognized.
Chlystek v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1979).
1. Chlystek v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1270, 1270 (3d Cir. 1979).
2. Id. at 1271. For a discussion of the Social Security Act, see notes 12-19 and accompany-
ing text infra.
3. 599 F.2d at 1270.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). For a discussion of the
Pennsylvania paramour statute, see notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
5. 599 F.2d at 1270.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1271 n. 1. For a brief discussion of common law marriage in Pennsylvania, see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-23 (Purdon 1965); note 24 and accompanying text infra.
8. 599 F.2d at 1271. While Adam was alive, Helen had filed applications for social security,
benefits as his wife, but these applications were denied on the ground that, under Pennsylvania
law, she was not Adain's wife. Id. The Chlysteks subsequently brought suit to declare the
paramour statute unconstitutional and to compel the Register of Wills to issue them a marriage
license. Id. On the second appeal from the district court's dismissal of the suit, the Third
Circuit reversed and instructed the lower court to address the constitutional issue. Chlystek v.
Kane, 540 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'g 412 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See also Chlystek v.
Kane, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975) (unpublished opinion) (vacating and remanding the first
dismissal by the district court). Adam's death prior to the filing of the court of appeal's decision
to remand, however, ended the litigation for wife's benefits and prompted Helen to file for
widow's benefits. See Chlystek v. Califano, 599 F.2d at 1271.
9. 599 F.2d at 1271. Denial of the claimant's request for review rendered the Administra-
tive Law Judge's decision final. Id.
10. id.
11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Garth, and Hunter. Judge Hunter wrote the
opinion.
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The Social Security Act 12 was enacted by Congress in 1935 to help
alleviate the insecurities of old age and unemployment. 13  As amended in
1939, the Act provides for benefits to the family of a retired or deceased wage
earner. 14  Although jurisdiction to adjudicate social security claims is re-
served to the federal courts, 15 thus rendering eligibility for benefits a federal
question, 16 family status under the Act is determined, with limited excep-
tion, 1 7 by the law of the state in which the wage earner is, or was,
domiciled.18 In order to protect the wage earner and his family from incon-
sistencies and inequities resulting from differences in state law, however,
Congress has provided that if the parties, in good faith, went through a
marriage ceremony, they will be deemed to be married for the purposes of
the Social Security Act even though the domiciliary state would not find
them validly married. 19
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 201,
49 Stat. 620).
13. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1946). The Silk Court stated:
The Social Security Act of 1935 was the result of long consideration by the President
and Congress of the evil of the burdens that rest upon large numbers of our people
because of the insecurities of modern life, particularly old age and unemployment. It was
enacted in an effort to coordinate the forces of government and industry for solving these
problems.
Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202, 53
Stat. 1360).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
16. See 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.323[20], at 3385 (2d ed. 1976), citing Burns v.
Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975); Carlson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Maloney v. Celebrezze,
337 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1964); Nicholas v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 126 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1942).
Federal courts are not required to apply state law when deciding a federal question under the
doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra, 0.318[2] at 3251. The Social Security Act, however, mandates that family status
is to be determined by the law of the state where the wage earner is domiciled. See note 18 and
accompanying text infra. Where the federal court finds, however, that the application of state
law would impede the underlying objectives of the Act, it may decline to apply state law. See
Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909, 911 (D. Vt. 1957); IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra, 0.323[20] at 3388. For a discussion of the role of state law in federal question cases,
see generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (3d ed. 1976).
17. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
An applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or widower of a fully or currently insured
individual for purposes of this subchapter if the courts of the State in which such insured
individual is domiciled . . . would find that such applicant and such insured individual
were validly married at the time such applicant files such application or, if such insured
individual is dead, at the time he died.
Id.
19. Id. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
In any case where . . . an applicant is not . . . the wife, widow, husband, or widower
of a fully or currently insured individual . . . but it is established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that such applicant in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with such
individual resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal imped-
iment not known to the applicant at the time of such ceremony, would have been a valid
marriage, and such applicant and the insured individual were living in the same house-
hold at the time of the death of such insured individual . . . such purported marriage
shall be deemed to be a valid marriage.
1100
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Many of the courts which have interpreted the Act have stated that, as
a remedial statute, it is to be construed broadly and its benefits are to be
liberally granted in order to ease the economic burdens of the aged and
unemployed. 20  Courts taking this approach have granted social security ben-
efits although it was arguable that a technical requirement of eligibility had
not been fulfilled.2 1  In two cases, however, women claiming to be common
law wives were denied widow's benefits, one on the ground that the state
did not recognize common law marriage, 2 2 and the other on the ground that
the state requirements for establishing a common law marriage had not been
met.
2 3
Pennsylvania law recognizes the validity of a common law marriage, 24
but, since 1815, has prohibited any marriage between a person previously
divorced on the grounds of adultery and the partner to the adulterous con-
Id. (emphasis added). The statute defines a legal impediment as an impediment which arises out
of a procedural defect in the marriage or an unwitting failure to dissolve a previous marriage.
Id. Congress attempted to avoid the vagaries of state law because "[tihe state laws governing
marriage and divorce are sometimes complex and subject to differing interpretations, a person
may believe that he is validly married when he is not." S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1960), reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3608, 3629. See also note 16
supra.
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1979); Rosenberg v. Richardson,
538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976); Sierakowski v. Weinberger, 504 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1974); Pleasant
v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971); Rasmussen v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 589 (10th Cir.
1967); Hoffman v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1966); Rodriquez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d
494 (1st Cir. 1965); Delno v. Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1965); Brown v. United States,
330 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1964); Conklin v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1963); Celebrezze
v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963).
21. See, e.g., Damon v. Secretary of HEW, 557 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977) (child, not adopted
within statutory time period, eligible for children's benefits); Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664
(2d Cir. 1969) (part-time student eligible for student benefits despite statutory requirement of
full-time student status); Schmiedigan v. Celebrezze, 245 F. Supp. 825, (D.D.C. 1965) (widow
living in mental hospital eligible for widow's benefits despite statutory requirement that she live
in wage earner's household); Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D. Vt. 1957) (remarried
widow, whose marriage was annulled, eligible for widow's benefits, despite statutory provision
to the contrary). Compare Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976) (both legal
widow and "deemed" widow eligible for share of widow's benefits despite statutory provision
indicating only legal widow is eligible) with Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1979)
(granting widow's benefits only to legal widow).
22. Sanabria v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 538 (D.P.R. 1975). Only thirteen states
currently recognize common law marriage: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. See Com-
ment, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 579, 585 (1978), citing H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 67 (2d ed. 1974).
23. Peters v. Weinberger, 337 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (failure to prove present
agreement to be married). Although the requirements to establish a common law marriage may
vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, all require that the parties have entered a pres-
ent agreement to be husband and wife. See Comment, supra note 22, at 579 n.4.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-23 (Purdon 1965). The elements of a Pennsylvania common
law marriage are set forth in the case law. The courts look for an expression of present inten-
tion, at some time, to assume the relationship of husband and wife. Buradus v. General Cement
Prods. Co., 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 48 A.2d 883 (1946), aff'd, 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947).
When evidence of present intent is lacking, marriage is presumed if the parties live together
and hold themselves out as husband and wife. 159 Pa. Super. Ct. at 504, 48 A.2d at 885.
1979-19801 1101
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duct.2 5  Similar paramour statutes in other states have been repealed.2 6
Pennsylvania is the only state which continues to restrict adulterous
paramours' ability to marry. 27
In the 1898 case of In re Stull's Estate,2 8 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania applied the paramour statute to deny plaintiff's application for
letters of administration to her husband's estate, holding that their marriage,
validly contracted in Maryland, but in contravention of Pennsylvania's
paramour statute, was void.2 9 The court reasoned that the paramour statute
absolutely prohibited an adulterous couple from marrying so long as the in-
jured spouse was living, regardless of the location or the circumstances
under which the purported marriage took place. 30
Relying on the broad and forbidding language of Stull, the Third Cir-
cuit, in Warrenberger v. Folsom,3 1 denied social security benefits to a
woman ceremonially married out-of-state in contravention of the paramour
statute. 32  The court, finding that the plaintiff's marriage was invalidated by
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (originally enacted as Act of
March 13, 1815, ch. 4104, 1815 PA. LAWS 286, 289 (amended 1971). The statute provides:
The husband or wife, who shall have been guilty of the crime of adultery, shall not
marry the person with whom the said crime was committed, during the life of the former
wife or husband; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to or affect or
render other than legitimate any children born of the body of the wife during coverture.
Id. It is not necessary that the spouse be convicted of adultery in a criminal proceeding; adul-
tery shown in the divorce proceeding is sufficient. Chlystek v. Califano, 599 F.2d at 1271, citing
In re Lenherr's Estate, 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974); Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D.
& C. 195 (1945). Pennsylvania law prohibits the issuance of a marriage license to the paramours.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5 (Purdon 1965).
26. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West) (repealed 1972); N.Y. DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS LAW § 8 (McKinney 1964) (repealed 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-831 (repealed 1970);
VA. CODE § 20-119 (repealed 1975).
27. Grose, A Constitutional Analysis of Pennsylvania's Restrictions Upon Marriage, 83
DICK. L. REV. 71, 93 (1978). It has been suggested that the paramour statute unconstitutionally
infringes on the fundamental right to marry in that it does not pass the "critical examination" to
which statutory classifications which "significantly interfere" with fundamental rights are subject.
Id. For a discussion of the fundamental right to marry, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. 183 Pa. 625, 39 A. 16 (1898).
29. Id. at 637, 39 A. at 20. Following decedent's divorce by his first wife on the ground of
adultery, the decedent and the plaintiff, who had been named as the correspondent in the
divorce proceeding, were ceremonially married in Maryland and returned to Pennsylvania
where they lived as man and wife. Id. at 628, 39 A. at 16.
30. Id. at 629, 39 A. at 16. The court stated the prohibition in no uncertain terms:
[Tihere is an absolute prohibition of any subsequent marriage between the guilty
person and the paramour during the life of the former wife or husband. . . A personal
incapacity to marry is imposed. The necessary meaning of [the statutory] language is that
they shall not marry at all, in any circumstances, or at any time or in any place, so long as
the injured party is living.
Id.
31. 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956).
32. Id. at 848. The applicant in Warrenberger, having been divorced by her first husband
on the ground of adultery with the deceased wage earner, subsequently went through a cere-
monial marriage with her paramour. Id. The congressional exception for parties who go through
a marriage ceremony in good faith was not enacted until 1960 and was, therefore, not available
to the Warrenberger court. For a discussion of this exception, see note 19 supra.
1102
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the paramour statute, held that the plaintiff was not the decedent's widow
for purposes of the Social Security Act. 33
Most recently, in In re Lenherr's Estate,3 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recognized a valid out-of-state marriage contracted in contravention of
the paramour statute for the purpose of allowing a widow to claim the mari-
tal exemption to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax. 35 The Lenherr court
reasoned that a marriage may be valid for some incidents or purposes, while
invalid for others.3 6 Analyzing the validity of the marriage as a conflict of
laws question, 3 7 the court decided that the marriage, valid in the state
where it was contracted, was valid in Pennsylvania unless it violated a strong
Pennsylvania public policy interest. 38 The Lenherr court found that the
state's policy of protecting the "sensibilities of the injured spouse" 39 was
outweighed by the need for uniform recognition of marriages, and by the
strong state interest in allowing property accumulated by the mutual efforts
of two people living as husband and wife "to pass to the survivor without the
imposition of a tax." 40
With this historical framework in mind, the Third Circuit, in Chlystek,
found that the absolute prohibition of the paramour statute, as interpreted in
Stull, had been undermined by the more liberal approach taken by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lenherr.4 ' Although the Lenherr court
33. 239 F.2d at 849.
34. 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974).
35. Id. at 232, 314 A.2d at 259. After both had been divorced on the ground of adultery,
but while their respective spouses were still living, Leo Lenherr and Sarah Barney went to
West Virginia and were ceremonially married. Id. at 227, 314 A.2d at 257. They subsequently
returned to Pennsylvania where they lived until Leo Lenherr's death. Id. For the marital
exemption to the Pennsylvania Transfer Inheritance Tax, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 2485-
2311 (Purdon 1965).
36. 455 Pa. at 230-31, 314 A.2d at 258. Finding support for this approach in the paramour
statute itself, the court noted that "the legislature has determined that at least one incident of
marriage-the legitimacy of children-is not to be denied despite the prior adjudication of
adultery." Id., citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
37. id. at 230, 314 A.2d at 257.
38. Id. at 230-32, 314 A.2d at 258-59. The court adopted the conflict of laws rule set forth in
the second Restatement of Conflict of Laws: "A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong
public policy of another state which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 283(2)
(1971). The Lenherr court determined that Pennsylvania had the most significant relationship to
the spouses and the marriage. 455 Pa. at 230, 314 A.2d at 258.
39. Id. at 231-32, 314 A.2d at 258-59. According to the Lenherr court, the paramour statute
"is intended not so much as a penalty upon the parties who failed to recognize the sanctity of
the former marriage vow as it is intended to protect the sensibilities of the injured spouse." Id.
at 231, 314 A.2d at 258.
40. Id. at 232, 314 A.2d at 259. The court reasoned that recognition of the marriage would
foster the policy of the marital exemption to the inheritance tax, whereas denial of the marriage
would not further the policy of the paramour statute. Id. The court stated:
Such denial could [protect the injured spouse] only if it: (1) could deter either the
adulterous conduct during the valid marriage or the subsequent marriage of the guilty
spouse and his or her paramour; or (2) could in any way spare the aggrieved former
spouse the affront caused by such marriage.
Id.
41. 599 F.2d at 1272.
5
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spoke in terms of conflict of laws, the Third Circuit adopted the Pennsyl-
vania court's policy rationale to validate the Chlysteks' marriage despite the
absence of a prior out-of-state marriage.4 2
The Chlystek court concluded that the policies of the Social Security
Act 4 3 outweigh those of the paramour statute.4 4  The court further
analogized to the Lenherr decision, finding that, because social security ben-
efits are based on the contributions of the wage earner,4 5 widow's benefits
are, as is accumulated property, the product of the couple's joint effort.4 6
Although the Chlysteks had not been ceremonially married as required
by the statutory exception, 47 the court interpreted Congress' limited recog-
nition of technically invalid marriages as an indication that the goals of the
Social Security Act outweigh state marriage restrictions for some pur-
poses. 48  Furthermore, the court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to col-
lect widow's benefits would not deprive the decedent's former wife of social
security benefits had she been receiving them. 49 Lastly, the court deter-
mined that denial of widow's benefits would neither deter the adulterous
conduct nor spare the former spouse the affront caused by the second mar-
riage. 50 The court concluded that, on balance, Helen Chlystek was entitled
to social security benefits as Adam's widow. 51
It is submitted that the distinguishing ceremonial out-of-state marriage
in Lenherr 52 simply allowed the Pennsylvania court to make a policy deci-
42. Id. at 1273. The defendant in Chlystek had argued that Lenherr was distinguishable in
that, in the latter case, the parties had been ceremonially and validly married in another state.
Id. at 1273 n.2. The court responded that, in view of the Pennsylvania court's reliance on policy
considerations, the Lenherr court would have validated the marriage had no out-of-state cere-
mony taken place. Id. The court observed: "Certainly, the Pennsylvania courts would not want
to encourage its citizens to avoid the application of the state's own marriage laws by fleeing the
jurisdiction." Id.
43. For a discussion of the policies of the Social Security Act, see notes 12-19 and accom-
panying text supra.
44. 599 F.2d at 1274. For a discussion of the policies of the paramour statute, see note 39
and accompanying text supra.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1976).
46. 599 F.2d at 1273. See also note 40 and accompanying text supra.
47. See 599 F.2d at 1273 n.4; note 19 and accompanying text supra.
48. 599 F.2d at 1273 n.4.
49. Id. at 1274 n.6. The Social Security Act provides for widow's benefits to "the widow and
every surviving divorced wife." Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1976) (emphasis by the court).
50. 599 F.2d at 1272-73. It should be noted that this was the reasoning used by the Lenherr
court. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra. The Chlystek court remarked: "Certainly,
the future availability of federal old age benefits would not be a big factor in the decision
whether to engage in an adulterous relationship." 599 F.2d at 1273. The court further noted
that the Pennsylvania Legislature decriminalized adultery in 1972, interpreting the change as a
legislative judgment that adultery was no longer a matter for strict regulation. Id. at 1274 n.5,
citing Act of Dec. 6, 1972, Act No. 334, 1972 PA. LAWS 1482-1613 (amending Pennsylvania
criminal code without providing for crime of adultery). For the text of the former aldultery
statute, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4505 (Purdon 1965) (repealed 1972).
51. 599 F.2d at 1274. Because the court upheld the plaintiff's entitlement on statutory
grounds, it did not reach her argument that the paramour statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 1274
n.7.
52. See 455 Pa. at 227, 314 A.2d at 257; notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
1104
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sion under the guise of solving a conflict of laws problem, 53 and that the
Third Circuit properly concluded that the Lenherr court would have recog-
nized plaintiff as the decedent's widow even if there had been no out-of-state
marriage. 54  Had the Pennsylvania court wanted to invalidate the marriage,
it could have either relied on the Stull court's refusal to recognize a valid
out-of-state marriage 55 or balanced the conflict of laws in favor of the
paramour statute. 56 By validating the marriage, the Lenherr court effec-
tively overruled Stull, implying that the state interest behind the paramour
statute was currently less compelling than at the time of the Stull decision. 57
Nevertheless, since eligibility for social security benefits is a federal
question, 58 the federal courts need not apply state law if they find that the
particular state law would thwart the objectives of the Social Security Act. 59
Considering that Congress explicitly sought to protect wage earners and
their families from inconsistencies in state marriage laws 6 0 and that most
courts have held that the Act should be construed liberally in order to sup-
ply at least a minimum level of support to the elderly and unemployed,6 1 it
is submitted that the Chlystek court properly granted Helen Chlystek
widow's benefits. Unlike other cases in which purported common law wives
were denied widow's benefits,6 2 Helen was able to establish all of the ele-
ments of a valid common law marriage in Pennsylvania,6 3 a state which rec-
ognizes common law marriage. 6 4 The only barrier to her eligibility for social
security benefits was the restriction of the paramour statute,6 5 a restriction
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated is not so strict as to
defeat all claims involving incidents of marriage. 66
Because Pennsylvania is the only state which still has a paramour statute
in effect, 67 the direct impact of Chlystek will be somewhat limited. Read
53. See 455 Pa. at 230, 314 A.2d at 257; notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
54. See 599 F.2d at 1273 n.2; note 42 and accompanying text supra.
55. See 183 Pa. at 629, 39 A. at 16; notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
56. For the Lenherr court's balancing of conflicting policies in applying the conflict of laws
rule, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
57. See 455 Pa. at 232, 314 A.2d at 259.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1976). See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 16 supra.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976); note 19 and accompanying text supra.
61. For a discussion of the courts' liberal construction of the Social Security Act, see notes
20-21 and accompanying text supra.
62. For a discussion of cases in which purported common law wives were denied social
security benefits, see notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
63. 599 F.2d at 1271 n.1. Compare id. with Peters v. Weinberger, 337 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.
Fla. 1974). For a brief discussion of Peters, see note 23 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of common law marriage in Pennsylvania, see note 24 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-23
(Purdon 1965) with Sanabria v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 538 (D.P.R. 1975). For a brief
discussion of Sanabria, see note 22 and accompanying text supra.
65. 599 F.2d at 1271 n.1. For a discussion of the paramour statute, see note 25 and accom-
panying text supra.
66. See In re Lenherr's Estate, 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974); notes 34-40 and accom-
panying text supra.
67. See Grose, supra, note 27, at 93. For a partial listing of states which have repealed
paramour statutes, see note 26 supra.
1979-1980] 1105
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most narrowly, Chlystek overrules Warrenberger68 with the result that a
person domiciled in Pennsylvania will no longer be denied social security
benefits because of the paramour statute. 69 Read more broadly, Chlystek
provides precedent for granting other federal claims, such as veteran's ben-
efits 70 or recovery under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 71 to spouses
whose marriages may be otherwise invalid under the paramour statute.
Further, the case may have persuasive value for Pennsylvania courts ad-
judicating state claims such as workmen's compensation72 or property rights
which arise as an incident of marriage. 73 Moreover, Chlystek certainly adds
to the number of cases which support a liberal construction of the Social
Security Act. 74
In conclusion, it should be noted that, as more incidents of marriage
become exempted from the effect of the paramour statute, the Pennsylvania
legislature may see fit to repeal the statute altogether. 75 This action may be
further prompted by the fact that no other state still has a paramour stat-
ute 76 and by a recent constitutional challenge. 77
Barbara A. Schneller
68. For a discussion of Warrenberger, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Chlystek v. Califano, 599 F.2d at 1274.
70. See National Service Life Insurance Act of 1957, 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1976).
71. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 561 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
73. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (intestacy
rights); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (support payments). See also
Commonwealth ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 134, 279 A.2d 311 (1971) (support
order contested on ground that marriage was void because of prior existing marriage).
74. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
75. The paramour statute was amended in 1971 to provide minor wording changes. Com-
pare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon 1965) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-1980). It may be argued that this recent reenactment indicates legislative support of
the paramour statute. It is submitted, however, that if the courts continue to whittle away at
the scope of the statute, the legislature may be persuaded to repeal it.
76. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 27 supra.
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